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INTRODUCTION 
On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark 
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia,1 ruling by a vote of 6–3 
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 protects gay, lesbian, and 
transgender employees from discrimination.  The majority held that the 
statute’s prohibition against discrimination in employment “because of . . . 
sex” necessarily applies to discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
transgender identity.3 
This decision will undoubtedly have ramifications reaching beyond 
the employment context because many other federal statutes contain 
language similar to that in Title VII.  In particular, the federal Fair Housing 
Act (FHA),4 which has identical language prohibiting discrimination in 
housing “because of . . . sex,”5 should also now be interpreted to prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  This is an 
obvious next step given the similar language, structure, and purpose of 
both statutes, and the courts’ long-standing tendency to use Title VII cases 
to guide their interpretation of the FHA.  This would also be a welcome 
development for housing equity, considering the significant discrimination 
that gay, lesbian, and transgender individuals experience in housing and 
the dearth of legal protections in place for them. 
It may be tempting for advocates to simply point to the textual 
similarity between the statutes and declare the matter resolved.  We should 
go further, however, because it is important to understand how the 
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 1.   140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).   
 2.   42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.   
 3.   Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.   
 4.   42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631.   
 5.   Id. at § 3604(a).   
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reasoning behind Title VII cases applies to the FHA.  It is not always true 
that Title VII analysis developed in the workplace context can translate 
seamlessly to the housing context, even when the statutory language is 
similar or identical.  In this case, however, the Title VII analysis applies 
equally well, if not better, in the FHA context. 
There is one area that presents a potential hurdle: the problem of mixed 
motives.  Whether discrimination is “based on sex” is ultimately a 
causation argument.  The court must determine what role the characteristic 
of “sex” played in the defendant’s decision to discriminate against an 
LGBTQ individual.  Defendants in discrimination cases often offer a non-
prohibited reason for their actions.  Where there are two or more possible 
motivations behind a discriminatory act (one permissible and one 
prohibited), the court is confronted with a mixed motives scenario.  The 
Supreme Court, interpreting the phrase “because of sex,” set forth a 
manner for plaintiffs to proceed under such circumstances in Title VII 
cases.  Congress then amended Title VII to explicitly allow plaintiffs to 
proceed under a mixed motives theory, though it altered the Supreme 
Court’s framework.  The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of 
mixed motives under the FHA, nor has the statute been amended as Title 
VII was.  If Bostock’s reasoning relies on the mixed motives theory, it 
might not be so easy to apply its conclusions to the FHA. 
Fortunately, for fair housing advocates, this is not the case.  Although 
much of the Bostock opinion examines the causal role that sex plays in 
sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination,6 it ultimately 
determines that the issue does not create a mixed motives question.  
Bostock does not hold that defendants who discriminate against LGBTQ 
individuals are motivated by both discrimination based on sex and 
discrimination based on another, permissible characteristic.  Rather, 
Bostock holds that sex discrimination is inextricably linked to 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.7  Thus, the 
mixed motive issue never arises, and the differences between the two 
statutes on this point are irrelevant. 
Part I of this Article outlines the significant level of discrimination 
against LGBTQ individuals in the housing market.  The FHA does not 
specify that sexual orientation and gender identity are protected 
characteristics, and there is an insufficient patchwork of state statutory and 
administrative protections.  This is similar to the employment context, 
where Congress’s failure to include explicit protections for LGTBQ 
individuals in Title VII left the heavy-lifting to the courts, which gradually 
 
 6.   Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–43. 
 7.   Id. at 1746–47. 
2021]  SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 411 
developed doctrines to read such protections back into the statute. 
Part II reviews the courts’ evolving treatment of sexual orientation and 
gender identity under Title VII and the smaller number of cases following 
the same pattern in the FHA.  In particular, those courts which upheld 
plaintiffs’ claims relied on three types of arguments: (1) the argument that 
LGBTQ individuals defy sex-role stereotypes, and that sex-role 
stereotyping constitutes discrimination “based on sex,” (2) a textual 
“comparative argument,” which looks in many ways like a causation 
analysis, and (3) a related associational argument.  This Part concludes 
with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock, which relied 
heavily on the comparative argument. 
Part III analyzes how courts use Title VII precedent for guidance in 
fair housing cases.  It argues that the propriety of this practice will depend 
on whether there are any relevant differences between the employment and 
housing contexts.  In this case, there are no significant contextual 
differences, and thus Bostock’s interpretation of “because of sex” should 
apply equally to sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination 
claims brought under the FHA.  Indeed, as with Title VII, there is strong 
precedent in favor of broadly interpreting the FHA to cover claims and 
plaintiffs that Congress may not have originally intended to cover. 
Part IV examines the possible mixed motives issue.  It discusses the 
potential for the “because of sex” causation argument to implicate mixed 
motives.  It also examines the potential for the differences between the two 
statutes to complicate attempts to apply Bostock to the FHA.  This is not a 
problem, however, because Bostock’s reasoning does not in fact implicate 
mixed motives at all.  Thus, there is no reason not to apply Bostock’s 
holding to the FHA. 
I.  SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING 
A. Housing Discrimination Against LGBTQ Individuals 
Housing discrimination is a problem for gay and transgender 
individuals.  Survey studies indicate that a sizable percentage (73%) of gay 
and transgender individuals fear such discrimination,8 and that whether a 
state has legal protections against such discrimination is a significant 
factor for many when determining where to live.9  In a 2001 survey by the 
 
 8.   2015 LGBT Home Buyer and Seller Survey, NAT’L ASS’N OF GAY & LESBIAN REAL EST. 
PROS. 3, 17 (2015), https://naglrep.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/naglrep-lgbt-survey-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EJN-73PX]. 
 9.   Id. at 3, 13. 
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Kaiser Family Foundation, 34% of gay and lesbian respondents reported 
that they or someone they knew had experienced discrimination when 
seeking to rent or buy a house.10 
Research studies, including matched pair testing, also indicate 
discrimination against LGBTQ individuals, although the extent of the 
discrimination they measure varies based on the form of the test 
performed.  A 2013 study that relied on email contacts found that same-
sex couples were significantly less likely to receive responses to email 
inquiries than heterosexual couples.11  Studies that relied on telephone or 
in-person testing report higher rates of discrimination, even in states with 
legal prohibitions against such behavior.  For example, testing conducted 
by four fair housing centers in Michigan found that 27% of the tests 
showed a disparity in treatment based on sexual orientation, including 
differences in rental rates, level of encouragement, and application fees, 
all favoring the heterosexual test teams.12  The researchers also observed 
“behavior bordering on sexual harassment directed toward testers posing 
as same-sex couples.”13 
In 2017, the Urban Institute conducted a multi-state, in-person testing 
project, the most significant such project to date.14  The researchers found 
that gay men posing as housing-seekers were told about fewer units and 
quoted higher rental fees than straight testers.15  Transgender testers were 
less likely to be told about available units, or were told about fewer units, 
 
 10.   Inside-OUT: A Report on the Experiences of Lesbians, Gays and  
Bisexuals in America and the Public’s Views on Issues and Policies Related to Sexual  
Orientation, KAISER FAM. FOUND. Chart 4 (Nov. 2001), https://www.kff.org/wp-conte 
nt/uploads/2013/01/new-surveys-on-experiences-of-lesbians-gays-and-bisexuals-and-the-public-s-
views-related-to-sexual-orientation-chart-pack.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA7C-PTQG].  Interestingly, in 
the same survey, 74% of the general public surveyed expressed support for “[l]aws to protect gays and 
lesbians from prejudice and discrimination in housing.”  Id. at Chart 17. 
 11.   Samantha Friedman, Angela Reynolds, Susan Scovill, Florence R.  
Brassier, Ron Campbell & McKenzie Ballou, An Estimate of Housing  
Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV. iv (2013), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/fairhsg/discrim_samesex.html [https://perma.cc/QP64 
-6SJL].  
 12.   Sexual Orientation and Housing Discrimination in Michigan: A Report of Michigan’s Fair 
Housing Centers, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF S.E. MICH. 9 (2007), https://www.fhcmichigan.org/ 
images/Arcus_web1.pdf [https://perma.cc/USX3-P23J]. 
 13.   Id.  
 14.   Diane K. Levy, Doug Wissoker, Claudia L. Aranda, Brent  
Howell, Rob Pitingolo, Sarale Sewell & Rob Santos, A Paired-Testing Pilot Study  
of Housing Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples and Transgender 
Individuals, URB. INST. viii (2017), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/paired-testing-pilot- 
study-housing-discrimination-against-same-sex-couples-and-transgenderindividuals/view/full_report  
[https://perma.cc/3KXL-P7VJ].   
 15.   Id. at xiii. 
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than cisgender testers.16  Another nationwide study noted an intersectional 
effect: while all same-sex couples were told about fewer units than 
heterosexual couples, black same-sex couples were treated even worse 
than white same-sex couples.17 
The problem is particularly acute for older LGBTQ individuals 
seeking to live in facilities for senior living.  Self-reports of discrimination 
against this group are high—in one survey of older LGBTQ individuals, 
13% of respondents reported that they had been discriminated against 
based on their sexual orientation and 25% of transgender older adults 
reported being discriminated against based on their gender identity.18  The 
actual numbers may be even higher, as victims of housing discrimination 
are often not aware that they have been discriminated against.  In 2014, a 
national investigation found that 48% of older LGBTQ people inquiring 
about housing in a senior living facility experienced “adverse differential 
treatment” and profound discrimination, including being given less 
information about available units, being charged higher fees, and being 
outright denied housing.19 
B.  Lack of Legal Protections 
LGBTQ individuals have few legal protections against discrimination 
in housing.  The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
a number of protected characteristics, including sex, but does not include 
sexual orientation or gender identity.20  Members of Congress have tried, 
unsuccessfully, to amend the statute to include these characteristics.21  
After the Obergefell v. Hodges22 opinion legalized same-sex marriage, the 
Equality Act was introduced multiple times.23  The Equality Act would 
have provided federal protection for gay people in housing, among other 
areas.  It was passed in the House in 2019 but died in committee once in 
 
 16.   Id. at xiv. 
 17.   David Schwegman, Rental Market Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples: Evidence 
from a Pairwise-Matched Email Correspondence Test, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 250, 251 (2019). 
 18.   Robert Espinoza, Out & Visible: The Experiences and Attitudes of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
and Transgender Older Adults, Ages 45-75, SAGE 19 (2014), https://www.sageusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/sageusa-out-visible-lgbt-market-research-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/JQ9J-ZBCK].  
 19.   Opening Doors: An Investigation of Barriers to Senior Housing for Same-Sex Couples, 
EQUAL RTS. CTR. 5 (2014), https://equalrightscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/senior_housing_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PTD-NHW6].  This was the case for the plaintiffs in Walsh v. Friendship 
Village, discussed infra Part II.B. 
 20.   42 U.S.C. § 3604. 
 21.   See H.R. 1447, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1328, 115th Cong. (2017).   
 22.   576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015).  
 23.   S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 788, 116th Cong. (2019).  
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the Senate.24  More recently, the bipartisan Fair and Equal Housing Act 
was introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 
30, 2019 and was referred to committee in the House on May 20, 2019.25  
The Fair and Equal Housing Act would provide consistent and explicit 
non-discrimination protections for LGBTQ people in housing by adding 
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” as protected characteristics 
under the Fair Housing Act.26  It has failed to make it out of committee in 
either chamber. 
State laws offer an inadequate patchwork of protection.  Only twenty-
two22 states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination in 
housing based on both sexual orientation and gender identity.27  Another 
state, Wisconsin, bans discrimination in housing based on sexual 
orientation only.28  A number of municipalities prohibit housing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, but these 
protections are typically ineffective and carry little force.29 
During the Obama administration, the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) took a number of steps to increase protections 
for LGBTQ individuals in housing.  In the summer of 2010, HUD issued 
a guidance document with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity 
complaints.30  A memorandum from the Assistant HUD Secretary for Fair 
Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) to regional FHEO directors about 
implementing the guidance document recognized that the federal Fair 
Housing Act does not specifically address sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or gender expression.31  The memo nevertheless instructs HUD 
 
 24.   German Lopez, The House Just Passed a Sweeping LGBTQ Rights Bill, VOX (May 17, 2019, 
12:14 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/17/18627771/equality-act-house-
congress-lgbtq-rights-discrimination [https://perma.cc/K3QY-CXAA]. 
 25.   H.R. 2402, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 1246 116th Cong. (2019). 
 26.   H.R. 2402; S. 1246. 
 27.   Nondiscrimination Laws, MAP (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/ 
non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/3CM3-ZKM2].   
 28.   Id. 
 29.   See generally Chad A. Readler, Local Government Anti-Discrimination Laws: Do They 
Make a Difference?, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 777, 783–88, 804, 812–13 (1998) (finding local 
ordinances are often poorly publicized, the Human Rights Commissions tasked with enforcing such 
ordinances are often poorly staffed, and that the remedies available to local agencies are often limited).  
Indeed, many local anti-discrimination ordinances do not allow a private right of action for victims of 
discrimination to sue for damages, instead relying on the municipal attorney to bring civil charges.  Id. 
at 794–95.  The maximum penalty in many cases is usually a small fine ($500 or less).  Id. at 798 
n.159, 800 n.176. 
 30.   Dana Rudolph, HUD Clarifies LGBT Housing Discrimination Practices, KEEN NEWS SERV. 
(July 7, 2010), https://keennewsservice.com/2010/07/07/hud-clarifies-lgbt-housing-discrimination-
protections/ [https://perma.cc/P995-8PTT].  The 2010 guidance document has been removed from 
HUD’s website. 
 31.   Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., on Assessing Complaints that 
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offices to “thoroughly review” allegations of LGBTQ discrimination in 
order to determine if the claims can be jurisdictional with respect to any 
existing protected classes.32  In other words, HUD recognized that LGBTQ 
status was not expressly covered as a protected characteristic by the 
statute, but nonetheless encouraged agency officials to find ways the FHA 
could protect the complainant by tying the discrimination to other 
protected characteristics. 
For example, if a man alleges that he is being evicted because he is gay 
and his landlord believes he will infect other tenants with HIV, then the 
allegation of discrimination may be jurisdictional under the Act based on 
disability because the man is regarded as having a disability, HIV/AIDS.  
Similarly, if a female prospective tenant is alleging discrimination by a 
landlord because she wears masculine clothes and engages in other 
physical expressions that are stereotypically male, then the allegation 
may be jurisdictional under the Act as discrimination based on sex.33 
The memo instructs agencies to refer any complaints lacking 
jurisdiction to state and local entities who might have authority under state 
law or municipal ordinance to pursue such complaints, and to track all such 
complaints in a federal database.34  Furthermore, the accompanying press 
release also made clear that “new [agency] guidance treats gender identity 
discrimination . . . as gender discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, 
and instructs HUD staff to inform individuals filing complaints . . . .”35  
This type of informal agency guidance does not carry the force of law akin 
to formal agency rulemaking, though courts can give deference to such 
guidance.36 
 
Involve Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression to FHEO Regional Directors 
 (June 15, 2010), https://www.fhcci.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HUD-Memo-on-LGBT-
discrimination-6-15-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXP2-9WQT].   
 32.   Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). 
 33.   Id. 
 34.   Id.  
 35.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., HUD Issues  
Guidance on LGBT Housing Discrimination Complaints (July 1, 2010), https://archives.hud.gov/ 
news/2010/pr10-139.cfm [https://perma.cc/5ULE-WVU5].  
 36.   When reviewing agency action, courts apply competing levels of deference depending on 
the type of action at issue.   
 
Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy 
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of 
law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference. . . . Instead, interpretations contained in 
formats such as [those] are “entitled to respect,” . . . but only to the extent that those 
interpretations have the “power to persuade.”   
 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)).   
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On February 3, 2012, HUD published a final regulation, the Equal 
Access Rule, to implement a “policy to ensure that its core programs are 
open to all eligible individuals and families regardless of sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or marital status.”37  This new rule revised the 
eligibility requirements for HUD-assisted or insured housing to require 
that “such housing shall be made available without regard to actual or 
perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, or marital status.”38 
In HUD’s comments accompanying the Rule, HUD noted that “certain 
complaints from LGBT persons would be covered by the Fair Housing 
Act. . . . includ[ing] discrimination because of nonconformity with gender 
stereotypes.”39  HUD also stated that it may have jurisdiction to “process 
a complaint filed under the Fair Housing Act if an LGBT person obtains 
housing but then experiences discrimination in the form of sexual 
harassment.”40  These measures failed, however, to have a significant 
impact on HUD’s enforcement of the FHA outside of HUD-owned or 
insured properties.  Only one court, in an unpublished opinion, found that 
this jurisdictional statement—narrowed as it was to gender stereotype and 
sexual harassment cases—was a permissible interpretation of the statute.41  
And even that case denied the plaintiff’s claim because it failed to fit into 
one of those categories.42 As this Article was being prepared for 
publication, however, HUD announced that it would take more dramatic 
steps to ensure that the FHA is enforced in a manner to protect LGBTQ 
individuals.43 
Without national statutory protection against housing discrimination, 
LGBTQ individuals were left to look to the courts for protection.  Judicial 
treatment of their claims, however, was heavily dependent on how courts 
in their jurisdiction had treated similar claims of sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination in Title VII cases.  As will be discussed in 
greater detail in Section III, courts hearing FHA cases tend to rely on Title 
 
 37.   Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender 
Identity, 77 Fed. Reg. 5662-01, 5662 (Feb. 3, 2012). 
 38.   Id. at 5674.  
 39.   Id. at 5666.  
 40.   Id. 
 41.   Thomas v. Osegueda, No. 2:15-CV-0042-WMA, 2015 WL 3751994, at *4 (N.D. Ala. June 
16, 2015) (“Considering the deference due by the court to agency interpretations, HUD’s narrow 
tailoring of jurisdiction for discrimination based on sexual orientation to protections for gender 
stereotyping in its interpretation of the FHA is a permissible reading of ‘sex.’”).  As will be discussed 
further in Section II, sexual harassment and sex-stereotyping cases were, for many years, the only 
types of cases the Supreme Court recognized in the Title VII context that could give rise to claims by 
LGBTQ individuals.  See infra Section II.A.2.  
 42.   Id. at *4–5. 
      43.     See infra Section IV, notes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
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VII cases for their analysis.  Thus, the next Section will trace the 
development of Title VII protections against sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination and show how a similar—but much slower—
evolution took place with FHA cases. 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER 
IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
A. Title VII 
Sexual orientation and gender identity are not specifically set forth 
among the protected characteristics in Title VII, which prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
religion, and sex.44  Nevertheless, a number of plaintiffs have brought 
cases under Title VII claiming they were harassed or discriminated against 
because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, arguing that such 
discrimination actually constitutes sex discrimination. 
1. Early Cases 
For decades, courts refused to hear claims of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity, concluding that “sex discrimination” 
simply did not encompass discrimination on these other bases.  Often, 
courts based this conclusion on the fact that when Congress passed Title 
VII it did not intend for the law to apply to sexual orientation or gender 
identity.  This type of intent analysis can be described as “expectations 
intent,” that is, the court looks at whether the legislature that passed the 
statute would have expected and intended for it to be used in this manner.45  
For example, in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.46 the court denied a 
transgender plaintiff’s claim, writing: 
 
 44.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 45.   While it is likely true that when Congress passed Title VII it was not thinking that “sex” 
might encompass sexual orientation and gender identity, it is also true that discerning congressional 
intent when it comes to the term “sex” is nearly impossible.  The amendment adding “sex” was passed 
one day before the House of Representatives approved Title VII and nothing significant emerged from 
the limited floor discussion.  Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386–87 (5th Cir. 
1971).  The amendment was introduced by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, who had 
opposed the Civil Rights Act, and was accused by some of wishing to sabotage its passage by his 
proposal of the “sex” amendment.  Peter F. Ziegler, Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 965, 968 (1973); Developments in the 
Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
1109, 1167 (1971). 
 46.   566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
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The cases interpreting Title VII sex discrimination provisions agree that 
they were intended to place women on an equal footing with men.  
Giving the statute its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress 
had only the traditional notions of “sex” in mind. . . .  Congress has not 
shown any intent other than to restrict the term “sex” to its traditional 
meaning.  Therefore, this court will not expand Title VII’s application in 
the absence of Congressional mandate.  The manifest purpose of Title 
VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination in employment is to ensure 
that men and women are treated equally, absent a bona fide relationship 
between the qualifications for the job and the person’s sex.47 
Later, DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. cited Holloway 
in denying claims brought by groups of gay and lesbian plaintiffs who 
argued that they had been harassed, discriminated against, and fired from 
their jobs because of their sexual orientation.  Other courts pointed out that 
Congress must have intended a “traditional” interpretation of the word 
“sex” because it placed the term along with immutable characteristics 
(race, color, national origin) and a characteristic “so deeply rooted for most 
that it is almost immutable ([similar to] religion).”48 
Courts that denied claims by LGBTQ individuals were also careful to 
distinguish “sex” from “sexual orientation” and “gender identity.”  They 
interpreted the phrase “because of sex” to mean only that the 
discrimination had occurred because a person was male or female.49  For 
example, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,50 the Seventh Circuit ordered 
the trial court to dismiss a claim brought by a transgender woman who was 
fired from her job.  Ulane stated that Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination means only “that it is unlawful to discriminate against 
women because they are women and against men because they are men.”51  
The court reasoned: 
If Eastern had considered Ulane to be female and had discriminated 
against her because she was female (i.e., Eastern treated females less 
favorably than males), then the argument might be made that Title VII 
applied, . . . but that is not this case.  It is clear from the evidence that if 
 
 47.   Id. at 662–63 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 48.   Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992); see also 
DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) 
(“The proscribed differentiation under Title VII, therefore, must be a distinction based on a person’s 
sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.”); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 
1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Congress in all probability did not intend for its proscription of sexual 
discrimination to have significant and sweeping implications.  We should not therefore extend the 
coverage of the Act to situations of questionable application without some stronger Congressional 
mandate.”). 
 49.   See cases cited supra note 48.  This, of course, failed to consider gender nonbinary 
individuals. 
 50.   742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 51.   Id. at 1085. 
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Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female, 
but because Ulane is a transsexual—a biological male who takes female 
hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to 
make it appear to be female.52 
2. Supreme Court Nuance 
The arguments about congressional intent and textual analysis were 
complicated by two Supreme Court opinions, Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,53 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.54  Oncale 
addressed the issue of congressional intent.  It involved a case of severe 
sexual harassment carried out in a workplace by a group of men against 
another man.55  Previous courts had ruled that Title VII’s prohibition of 
discrimination “because of sex” could not apply to same-sex sexual 
harassment because this could not have been Congress’s intent when it 
included “sex” as a protected characteristic in Title VII.56  Writing for a 
unanimous court, Justice Scalia rejected this argument.  While he 
recognized that same-sex harassment was surely not the problem that 
Congress sought to address when it enacted Title VII, he also observed: 
[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our 
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.  Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . 
sex” in the “terms” or “conditions” of employment.  Our holding that 
this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any 
kind that meets the statutory requirements.57 
In other words, the Court determined that regardless of what Congress 
intended, the words “because of sex” can cover a situation in which a man 
was harassed in a sexual manner, even if it was by other men.  In this sense, 
the Court was relying on “semantic intent,” which is to say that it looked 
to the plain meaning of the words regardless of what Congress might have 
intended when it passed Title VII.  The Court sought to clarify, noting that: 
[H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support 
 
 52.   Id. at 1087. 
 53.   523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 54.   490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 55.   Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.  It appears that all of the men involved––the assailants as well as the 
plaintiff––were heterosexual.  Thus, the issue of sexual orientation was not raised.  Id. at 79–81 (noting 
other courts find a claim actionable by someone of the same sex “only if the plaintiff can prove that 
the harasser is homosexual (and thus presumably motivated by sexual desire)”).  
 56.   Id. at 79–81. 
 57.   Id. at 79–80 (alteration in original). 
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an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.  A trier of fact might 
reasonably find such discrimination, for example, if a female victim is 
harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman as 
to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the 
presence of women in the workplace.58 
Price Waterhouse complicated the textual argument about sex-based 
discrimination.  In this case, the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim 
centered on the allegation that she was denied partnership at her 
accounting firm because the partners believed she was too aggressive 
(although aggressiveness was seen as a positive trait for male 
candidates).59  She also presented evidence that the partners did not think 
she looked or behaved in a “feminine” enough manner.60  Ultimately, she 
argued that these sentiments stemmed from sex-role stereotyping, 
specifically the belief that women should conform to sex-based 
expectations that they be pretty, demure, and compliant.61  A plurality of 
the Court found that discrimination based on sex-role stereotypes 
constituted discrimination “because of sex.”62  The plurality went on to 
clarify, noting: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n 
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”63 
Both cases led to some degree of chaos for discrimination claims 
brought by LGBTQ individuals.  After Oncale, courts struggled with the 
situation of same-sex sexual harassment where the victim was also gay or 
lesbian.  Many took the position that while Title VII could cover same-sex 
harassment generally, the statute did not apply when the harassment was 
motivated by the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.  Thus, courts found 
themselves in the difficult position of trying to disentangle whether 
harassment of a sexual nature was directed at a person because of the 
 
 58.   Id. at 80. 
 59.   Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35. 
 60.   Id. at 235.  The plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was not a lesbian, and thus there was no discussion 
of sexual orientation. 
 61.   Id. at 235–36. 
 62.   Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of 
a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”). 
 63.   Id. at 251 (alteration in original) (citing Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 
425 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)).  
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person’s sex, or because of their sexual orientation.64 
Price Waterhouse similarly led to a situation where courts had to 
determine whether the bare fact of a person’s homosexuality or 
transgender identity could serve as the basis for a sex discrimination claim 
using a sex stereotyping theory.65  In other words, does a lesbian 
automatically defy the sex-role stereotype that women should only be 
attracted to men?  Similarly, does a transgender individual defy sex-role 
stereotyping, by definition, because of their identity with a sex other than 
the one they were assigned at birth? 
Some courts permitted this sort of “bootstrap” argument, but others 
refused.  For example, in Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,66 the court denied 
a plaintiff’s claim, noting: 
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, however, gender 
stereotyping claims can easily present problems for an adjudicator.  This 
is for the simple reason that “[s]tereotypical notions about how men and 
women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about 
heterosexuality and homosexuality.”  Like other courts, we have 
therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used 
to “bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.”67 
Implicit in this reasoning was a refusal to recognize homosexuality 
itself as a failure to conform to sex-role stereotypes.  Instead, courts would 
require plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were nonconforming in other 
ways, such as in behavior or appearance.68  For example, in Simonton v. 
 
 64.   See Martin v. New York St. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 446–47 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002); Trigg v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 99-CV-4730 (ILG), 2001 WL 868336, at *5–6 
(E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim because the plaintiff’s “Amended Complaint is 
rife with references to sexual orientation, homophobia, and accusations of discrimination based on 
homosexuality.”), aff’d, 50 Fed. App’x. 458 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 65.   Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate 
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Queers, 
Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual 
Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 316 (1995) (noting that the courts 
seldom engaged in a principled application of sex stereotyping theory, and often refused to apply it to 
claims by LGBTQ individuals). 
 66.   398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 
2018). 
 67.   Id. at 218 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).  See also Phipps v. Hous. Auth. 
of New Orleans, No. 15-3296, 2016 WL 164916, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 2016) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2006)) (“[A] gender 
stereotyping claim should not be used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.  
Without alleging facts that would support a sex stereotyping theory, this is precisely what the plaintiff 
is attempting to do.”). 
 68.   Kristin M. Bovalino, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of Winning Title 
VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1134 (2003) (counseling “gay plaintiffs bringing claims 
under Title VII [to] emphasize the gender stereotyping theory and de-emphasize any connection the 
discrimination has to homosexuality.”). 
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Runyon, a gay postal worker alleged that he was subjected to an abusive 
and hostile work environment because of his sexual orientation.69  The 
court denied the plaintiff’s gender stereotyping claim, noting: 
Simonton has failed to plead sufficient facts for our consideration of the 
issue. . . . We do not have sufficient allegations before us to decide 
Simonton’s claims based on stereotyping because we have no basis in 
the record to surmise that Simonton behaved in a stereotypically 
feminine manner and that the harassment he endured was, in fact, based 
on his non-conformity with gender norms instead of his sexual 
orientation.70 
Thus, for many years the Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory 
was the only way plaintiffs could succeed in bringing sexual orientation 
and gender identity claims.  Even this theory would not always work, as 
some courts refused to allow bootstrapped claims where plaintiffs’ only 
gender nonconforming behavior was their sexual orientation or gender 
identity.  Oncale provided a narrow path for victims of same-sex 
harassment, but apparently only if the harassment was not based on the 
victim’s sexual orientation. 
3. Shifting Judicial Attitudes 
Recent years, however, have seen a shift in judicial attitudes toward 
such claims as society’s understanding of sexual orientation and gender 
identity have evolved.  In a 2017 refusal to hire case, Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, offered multiple 
arguments to support its conclusion that Title VII prohibits discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.71  The simplest was the Price Waterhouse 
sexual stereotyping argument, in which the court upheld the plaintiff’s 
 
 69.   232 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 70.   Id. at 38 (internal citations omitted).  See also Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 
260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (determining that a gay male plaintiff had no claim under Title VII 
because “he did not claim that he was harassed because he failed to comply with societal stereotypes 
of how men ought to appear or behave”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 
2000) (finding that a gay male automobile worker was subjected to harassment by fellow employees 
because of sexual orientation, not because “co-workers perceived him to be too feminine to fit the 
male image at Ford.”), overruled by Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 
2017) (en banc); cf. Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, No. CIV.A. 02-3157, 2003 WL 21197289, at 
*5 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 2003) (holding that gay male plaintiff “has shown that he was subjected to 
adverse treatment because [of] his co-workers[‘] perceptions that he was a ‘miss prissy’ or less than 
[a] ‘real man.’  As such, there is affirmative evidence that the harassment was related to perceptions 
about Mr. Kay’s masculinity, rendering the conduct gender stereotyping actionable under Title VII.”); 
but see Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002) (noting 
that a lesbian plaintiff stated Title VII claim by alleging discrimination based upon her failure to 
conform to supervisor’s “stereotype of how a woman ought to behave.”).   
 71.   853 F.3d 339, 350–51 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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bootstrapped claim.72 
Next, the court took on the contention that sex was textually distinct 
from sexual orientation.  Previous courts had found no sex discrimination 
because gay men and lesbians were equally discriminated against.  Hively 
rejected this argument, using what it referred to as “the tried-and-true 
comparative method.”73  This method required the court to isolate the 
significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision.74  The 
question, the court determined, was whether Hively had “described a 
situation in which, holding all other things constant and changing only her 
sex, she would have been treated the same way?”75 
Other courts purported to use this method but had not upheld 
plaintiffs’ claims.  Their reasoning was that an employer’s anti-gay 
discrimination affected men and women equally.  Hively argued that this 
reasoning was flawed: 
It is critical, in applying the comparative method, to be sure that only the 
variable of the plaintiff’s sex is allowed to change.  The fundamental 
question is not whether a lesbian is being treated better or worse than gay 
men, bisexuals, or transsexuals, because such a comparison shifts too 
many pieces at once.  Framing the question that way swaps the critical 
characteristic (here, sex) for both the complainant and the comparator 
and thus obscures the key point—whether the complainant’s protected 
characteristic played a role in the adverse employment decision.  The 
counterfactual we must use is a situation in which Hively is a man, but 
everything else stays the same: in particular, the sex or gender of the 
partner.76 
Applying this analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s sexual 
orientation claim was based on sex, because if she had been a man who 
was attracted to women, she would have been treated differently.77 
Finally, the court relied on a related associational theory, which had 
originally been used to address anti-miscegenation laws.78  As the court 
noted: 
It is now accepted that a person who is discriminated against because of 
the protected characteristic of one with whom she associates is actually 
being disadvantaged because of her own traits.  This line of cases began 
 
 72.   Id. at 342–43 (finding no argument that the plaintiff, Kristen Hively, defied gender 
stereotypes in any way beyond the fact that she was a lesbian). 
 73.   Id. at 345. 
 74.   Id.  
 75.   Id.  
 76.   Id.  
 77.   Id. at 346. 
 78.   Id. at 347. 
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with Loving [v. Virginia], in which the Supreme Court held that 
“restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications 
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”  The Court 
rejected the argument that miscegenation statutes do not violate equal 
protection because they “punish equally both the white and the Negro 
participants in an interracial marriage.”  When dealing with a statute 
containing racial classifications, it wrote, “the fact of equal application 
does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of 
justification” required by the Fourteenth Amendment for lines drawn by 
race. 
. . . . The Court in Loving recognized that equal application of a law that 
prohibited conduct only between members of different races did not save 
it.  Changing the race of one partner made a difference in determining 
the legality of the conduct, and so the law rested on “distinctions drawn 
according to race,” which were unjustifiable and racially discriminatory.  
So too, here.  If we were to change the sex of one partner in a lesbian 
relationship, the outcome would be different.  This reveals that the 
discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according to sex.79 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to 
recognize that sex discrimination, by its nature, encompasses sexual 
orientation discrimination without relying on a sex stereotyping theory. 
Courts have evolved in a similar way when it comes to gender identity 
and Title VII.  In Schroer v. Billington,80 the District Court for the District 
of Columbia held that discrimination against a transgender woman 
violated Title VII.  The court first upheld the plaintiff’s claim under a Price 
Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory.81  It went on to hold as a textual 
matter that gender identity discrimination is per se sex discrimination, as 
it necessarily involves consideration of both biological sex and gender, 
which is a key component of sex.82 
Schroer concluded that courts which had refused to recognize gender 
identity discrimination as sex discrimination had allowed their views of 
congressional intent to blind themselves to the plain language of the 
statute:83 
 
 79.   Id. at 347–49 (internal citations omitted). 
 80.   577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 81.   Id. at 305–06. 
 82.   Id. at 308 (“[T]he Library’s refusal to hire Schroer after being advised that she planned to 
change her anatomical sex by undergoing sex reassignment surgery was literally discrimination 
‘because of . . . sex.’”).  As one commentator noted, “[S]ince [Schroer’s] goal was not to transgress 
stereotypes, but to adopt an entirely new gender and conform to its stereotypes, Price Waterhouse did 
not apply.”  Michael J. Vargas, Title VII and the Trans-Inclusive Paradigm, 32 LAW & INEQ. 169, 191 
(2014). 
 83.   Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (“In other words, courts have allowed their focus on the 
label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory language itself.”). 
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The decisions [such as Ulane] holding that Title VII only prohibits 
discrimination against men because they are men, and discrimination 
against women because they are women, represent an elevation of 
“judge-supposed legislative intent over clear statutory text.”  [Courts 
which hold] that discrimination based on changing one’s sex is not 
discrimination because of sex . . . essentially reason “that a thing may be 
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not 
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”  This is no longer 
a tenable approach to statutory construction.  Supreme Court decisions 
[such as Oncale] have applied Title VII in ways Congress could not have 
contemplated.84 
B. FHA Cases 
Sexual orientation and gender identity claims brought under the FHA 
have followed a similar trajectory.  As with the early Title VII cases, the 
first courts to hear FHA claims of sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination dismissed them out of hand, often with little analysis.85 
One recent example of a court’s dismissal came in Walsh v. Friendship 
Village of South County.86  In that case, the plaintiffs, Mary Walsh and 
Beverly Nance, were an older, married couple who had been in a 
committed relationship for nearly forty years.87  They wished to move to 
a senior living community, and were particularly interested in a 
community called Friendship Village, in St. Louis County, Missouri.88  
After multiple visits and discussions with the community’s Residence 
Director, Carmen Fronczak, the couple submitted a $2,000 deposit and 
signed a waitlist agreement.89  A few days later, Ms. Fronczak called Ms. 
Walsh to inquire about the nature of her relationship with Ms. Nance, to 
which Ms. Walsh replied that they were married.90  Two days later, Ms. 
Fronczak called Ms. Walsh to inform her that Friendship Village’s 
Cohabitation Policy did not permit the plaintiffs to share a single residency 
unit.91 
Ms. Walsh later received a letter from the Corporate Operations 
 
 84.   Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 85.   See Miller v. 270 Empire Realty LLC, No. 09-CV-2857 (RJD)(RER), 2012 WL 1933798, 
*5–6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09-CV-2857 (RJD)(RER), 
2012 WL 1940829, *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012) (holding FHA claims cannot be based on sexual 
orientation); Swinton v. Fazekas, No. 06-CV-6139T, 2008 WL 723914, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2008). 
 86.   352 F. Supp. 3d 920 (E.D. Mo. 2019), vacated and remanded by 2020 WL 5361010, (8th 
Cir., July 2, 2020) (in light of Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., No. 17-1618, 2020 WL 3146686 (U.S. June 
15, 2020)). 
 87.   Id. at 922. 
 88.   Id. at 923. 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Id. 
 91.   Id.  
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Director of Friendship Village, which stated, “[y]our request to share a 
single unit does not fall within the categories permitted by the long-
standing policy of Friendship Village Sunset Hills, a copy of which is 
enclosed.”92  The Friendship Village Cohabitation Policy, attached to the 
letter, noted: 
It is the policy of Friendship Village . . . consistent with its long-standing 
practice of operating its facilities in accordance with biblical principles 
and sincerely-held religious standards, that it will permit the cohabitation 
of residents within a single unit only if those residents, while residing in 
said unit, are related as spouses by marriage, as parent and child or as 
siblings.  The term “marriage” as used in this policy means the union of 
one man and one woman, as marriage is understood in the Bible. . . .93 
Walsh and Nance filed an FHA suit against Friendship Village.  They 
made a bootstrapped Price Waterhouse argument, claiming Friendship 
Village discriminated against them on the basis of sex, because of their 
nonconformity with sex stereotypes, “including that a married woman 
should be in a different-sex relationship; that a married woman’s spouse 
should be a man; and that women should be attracted to and form 
relationships with men, not women.”94  Walsh and Nance also argued that 
sexual orientation discrimination was discrimination based on sex, and 
that they had each been discriminated against because of their association 
with a person of a particular sex.95 
Looking to employment law cases, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
sex stereotyping claim.  It determined that it “need not struggle with 
exactly where to draw the line between actionable discrimination based on 
what is alleged to be gender non-conforming behavior and non-actionable 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.”96  According to the court, the 
plaintiffs failed to present an actionable claim because they made clear that 
their theory of sex-stereotyping was based solely on their sexual 
orientation.  “Sexual orientation alone cannot be the alleged gender non-
conforming behavior that gives rise to an actionable Title VII claim under 
a sex-stereotyping theory,” the court held, because “[t]o hold otherwise 
would be contrary to well-settled law that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.”97 
 
 92.   Id. 
 93.   Id. 
 94.   Id. at 924. 
 95.   Id. at 924–26. 
 96.   Id. at 927 (quoting Pambianchi v. Arkansas Tech Univ., No. 4:13-cv-00046-KGB, 2014 WL 
11498236, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 2014)).  
 97.   Id. at 927 (quoting Pambianchi, 2014 WL 11498236, at *5); see also Thomas v. Osegueda, 
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The court engaged in a rudimentary comparative analysis, one that 
suffered from the same analytical flaw the Hively court had observed: 
At no time do Plaintiffs assert that had they been men involved in a same-
sex relationship or marriage, they would have been admitted as residents 
in Friendship Village.  Under these circumstances, the Court finds the 
claims boil down to those of discrimination based on sexual orientation 
rather than sex alone.98 
The court similarly dismissed the plaintiffs’ related associational 
claim.  Instead of recognizing the claim as one made by a woman who had 
been discriminated against for associating with another woman (thus 
making sex the relevant discriminatory category), the court appeared to 
treat the claim as one by a lesbian who wished to associate with another 
lesbian (thus making sexual orientation the relevant discriminatory 
category): 
While the Court agrees that claims of associational discrimination are 
cognizable at times, Plaintiffs present no evidence that such claims are 
actionable with respect to classes unprotected by the statute at issue.  As 
noted above, sexual orientation is one such unprotected class, and so this 
portion of Defendants’ motion must be granted.99 
The few courts to uphold sexual orientation and gender identity claims 
did so using the Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory.  Smith v. 
Avanti100 is a rare example of such a case.  Rachel and Tonya Smith are a 
married lesbian couple living in Colorado with their two children.101  
Rachel is also a transgender woman.102  When they sought to rent a 
townhouse for their family, Tonya disclosed Rachel’s transgender status 
to the current property owner.103  The property owner then requested 
photos of the family and held an in-person meeting with them.104  At this 
 
No. 2:15-CV-0042-WMA, 2015 WL 3751994, at *4 (N.D. Ala. June 16, 2015) (“Thomas does not 
petition under a theory of gender non-conformity but rather relies on sexual orientation as the sole 
basis for discrimination separate and independent of gender . . . . Even under HUD’s expanded 
interpretation of the FHA for gender stereotyping, these allegations are outside the scope of the FHA’s 
‘sex’ discrimination protection and therefore HUD lacks the jurisdiction for respondents to act upon 
them.”).   
 98.   Walsh, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 925–26. 
 99.   Id. at 927.  In February 2019, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit.  The Eighth Circuit put the appeal on hold pending the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Bostock v. Clayton County, and subsequently vacated the District Court’s opinion and remanded 
the case.  See supra note 86. 
 100.   249 F. Supp. 3d 1194 (D. Colo. 2017).  
 101.   Id. at 1197. 
 102.   Id. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. 
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meeting, the owner refused to rent to them, suggesting the Smiths’ “unique 
relationship” and “uniqueness” would become the town focus and would 
jeopardize the property owner’s “low profile” in the community.105 
The Smiths then filed suit, proceeding on a sex stereotyping theory, 
by arguing that discrimination against a lesbian couple “for failure to 
conform to stereotyp[ical] norms concerning to or with whom a woman 
should be attracted, should marry, and/or should have children is 
discrimination on the basis of sex under the FHA.”106  The court agreed 
with them, citing Price Waterhouse: “Such stereotypical norms are no 
different from other stereotypes associated with women, such as the way 
she should dress or act (e.g., that a woman should not be overly aggressive, 
or should not act macho), and are products of sex stereotyping.”107 
Next, the Smiths argued that discrimination against a transgender 
person because of her gender-nonconformity is a form of sex 
discrimination.  The court looked to Title VII, observing that: 
The Tenth Circuit looks to Title VII discrimination cases for guidance in 
addressing discrimination issues under the FHA. . . . [D]iscrimination 
against a transsexual based on the person’s status as a transsexual is not 
discrimination because of sex under Title VII.  However, the Smiths’ sex 
discrimination claim at issue is brought on the basis of gender 
stereotyping under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . . . and its progeny, and 
recognized as a possibility by the Tenth Circuit . . . .108 
In light of this guidance, the court agreed with the Smiths on a narrow 
basis: “To the extent the Smiths contend that discrimination against Rachel 
because she does not conform to gender norms of a male, e.g., does not act 
or dress like the stereotypical notions of a male, the Court agrees.”109  The 
court, however, refused to allow the argument to go any further.  In a 
somewhat muddled analysis, it rejected the notion that discrimination 
against a person solely on the basis of transgender identity or sexual 
orientation could constitute a sex stereotyping violation, or that such 
discrimination was per se sex-based discrimination.  “To the extent 
Plaintiffs are attempting to bootstrap such other theories onto their sex 
stereotype theory,” the court stated, it would not accept such a leap.110 
Despite the Avanti court’s protestations, its decision came vanishingly 
close to recognizing a bootstrapped theory for both sexual orientation and 
 
 105.   Id. at 1197–98. 
 106.   Id. at 1200. 
 107.   Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)).  
 108.   Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 109.   Id. at 1201. 
 110.   Id. 
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gender identity claims.  In essence, it held that if a defendant discriminates 
against a gay couple because their sexual orientation defies sex 
stereotypes, such a claim is actionable.  Similarly, it held that 
discrimination against a transgender person could be actionable so long as 
this discrimination was based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes.  
Of course, it is difficult to see how either of these types of discrimination 
do not always rest in some degree on sex stereotypes, but the court, 
perhaps in fear of violating Tenth Circuit precedent, was unwilling to state 
this explicitly. 
C. The Supreme Court Opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County 
The issue of whether Title VII covers discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity came before the Supreme Court in three 
different cases which were litigated separately but consolidated for 
purposes of the Supreme Court proceedings.  In Bostock v. Clayton County 
Board of Commissioners, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of a 
gay man’s Title VII claim, holding summarily that “[d]ischarge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”111  In Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, Inc., the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a gay man 
could bring a claim under Title VII alleging that he was fired due to his 
sexual orientation.112  Similarly, EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc. involved a transgender woman who was fired from her job.113  
Here, the Sixth Circuit noted that “[b]ecause an employer cannot 
discriminate against an employee for being transgender without 
considering that employee’s biological sex, discrimination on the basis of 
transgender status necessarily entails discrimination on the basis of sex—
no matter what sex the employee was born or wishes to be.”114 
The arguments made by the defendants in Harris Funeral Homes were 
the same as those in previous cases: (1) that textually, discrimination based 
on sexual orientation and gender identity is not the same thing as 
discrimination based on sex because each targets something more than just 
a person’s sex, and (2) that sexual orientation or gender identity could not 
be covered by Title VII because Congress did not intend for those to be 
protected characteristics.115  The Bostock majority, in an opinion authored 
 
 111.   723 F. App’x 964, 964 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979)), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599, (2019), rev’d and remanded 
by, 140 S. Ct. 1731, (2020).  
 112.   883 F.3d 100, 132 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 113.   884 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 114.   Id. at 578. 
 115.   Id. at 577–78. 
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by Justice Gorsuch, squarely rejected these arguments.116 
From a textual standpoint, Gorsuch relied on the type of comparative 
argument that prevailed in Hively.  The Bostock opinion clarified that sex 
is inseparable from sexual orientation and gender identity: 
[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual 
or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on 
sex.  Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of 
whom are attracted to men.  The two individuals are, to the employer’s 
mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and 
the other a woman.  If the employer fires the male employee for no 
reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer 
discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female 
colleague.  Put differently, the employer intentionally singles out an 
employee to fire based in part on the employee’s sex, and the affected 
employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his discharge.  Or take an employer 
who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but 
who now identifies as a female.  If the employer retains an otherwise 
identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer 
intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or 
actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth.  
Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and 
impermissible role in the discharge decision.117 
The majority also rejected the defense based on congressional intent.  
It recognized and rejected the expectations-based argument that the 
plaintiffs’ claims should fail because Congress likely did not anticipate 
Title VII being used to protect individuals from sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination in this particular way.  The text, it found, 
clearly supported the plaintiffs’ interpretation: 
Rather than suggesting that the statutory language bears some other 
meaning, the employers and dissents merely suggest that, because few in 
1964 expected today’s result, we should not dare to admit that it follows 
ineluctably from the statutory text.  When a new application emerges that 
is both unexpected and important, they would seemingly have us merely 
point out the question, refer the subject back to Congress, and decline to 
enforce the plain terms of the law in the meantime. 
That is exactly the sort of reasoning this Court has long rejected.  
Admittedly, the employers take pains to couch their argument in terms 
of seeking to honor the statute’s “expected applications” rather than 
vindicate its “legislative intent.”  But the concepts are closely related.  
One could easily contend that legislators only intended expected 
applications or that a statute’s purpose is limited to achieving 
 
 116.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–41 (2020). 
 117.   Id. at 1741–42. 
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applications foreseen at the time of enactment.  However framed, the 
employer’s logic impermissibly seeks to displace the plain meaning of 
the law in favor of something lying beyond it.118 
The Court went even further, recognizing that Congress deliberately 
drafted Title VII using broad and sweeping language, and thus, it must 
have intended for the law to apply in a variety of unexpected scenarios: 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in employment is a major 
piece of federal civil rights legislation.  It is written in starkly broad 
terms.  It has repeatedly produced unexpected applications, at least in the 
view of those on the receiving end of them.  Congress’s key drafting 
choices—to focus on discrimination against individuals and not merely 
between groups and to hold employers liable whenever sex is a but-for 
cause of the plaintiff ‘s injuries—virtually guaranteed that unexpected 
applications would emerge over time.119 
In this sense, the Court relied on a view of congressional intent that 
looked beyond the plain language of the statute (the semantic view) to the 
purpose of the statute.  In other words, the Court considered the normative 
principles and goals underlying Title VII, rather than focusing solely on 
the statute’s text. 
III. WHAT BOSTOCK MEANS FOR THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
Bostock established that Title VII’s “because of sex” language applies 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  The 
obvious next question is whether and to what extent this analysis should 
apply to the FHA’s identical language.  As discussed previously, when 
courts hear cases under the Fair Housing Act, they often look to Title VII 
case law for guidance.  This makes sense for a number of reasons.  Both 
statutes are remedial civil rights laws, passed within a few years of each 
other.  Both also follow a similar structure and, in a number of places, they 
contain identical or very similar language.120  The Supreme Court 
previously clarified that “when Congress uses the same language in two 
statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly 
after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text 
 
 118.   Id. at 1750. 
 119.   Id. at 1753. 
 120.   Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 530–
33 (2015) (comparing § 3604(a) of the FHA to Title VII); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 779 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (noting that § 3604(b) of the FHA mirrors Title VII); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., 
Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (describing Title VII and the FHA as 
“functional equivalent[s]” to be “given like construction and application.”). 
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to have the same meaning in both statutes.”121 
Indeed, in another recent case, Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the 
Supreme Court relied heavily on its Title VII jurisprudence in interpreting 
the FHA.  Specifically, the Court addressed whether plaintiffs could assert 
discrimination claims using disparate impact theory under the FHA.122  
This theory allows a plaintiff to bring a claim based on the adverse impact 
of a defendant’s actions, without arguing that these actions were 
intentionally discriminatory.123  The Supreme Court originally recognized  
disparate impact theory in an employment discrimination case, Griggs v. 
Duke Power Company,124 and Congress subsequently codified this 
decision in the 1991 amendments to Title VII.125  Congress did not, 
however, amend the FHA in a similar manner. 
In Inclusive Communities, the Court examined the same “because 
of. . .” language that appears in both Title VII and the FHA.  In Griggs, 
the Court determined that an adverse action could be taken “because of” a 
protected characteristic even if the action was not intentionally 
discriminatory.126  Looking to the similar language, structure, and purpose 
of the two statutes, the Court determined that the “because of” analysis in 
Griggs should apply equally to the FHA, which would allow housing 
plaintiffs to bring disparate impact claims.127 
The Court recognized that differences between the employment and 
housing contexts might affect how the affirmative defense to disparate 
impact claims would operate.  Specifically, the “business necessity” 
defense available to employers faced with disparate impact claims, does 
not translate perfectly to the housing context.128  While an employer’s 
business needs are probably somewhat straightforward, developers and 
municipalities may have multiple legitimate and competing factors to 
consider when making decisions about the siting and zoning of housing.129  
 
 121.   Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).  See Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 535 
(“This similarity in text and structure is all the more compelling given that Congress passed the FHA 
in 1968—only four years after passing Title VII . . . .”). 
 122.   Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 524–27.  
 123.   Id. 
 124.   401 U.S. 424, 431–33 (1971) (invalidating a hiring practice, even in the absence of 
discriminatory intent, because of its disparate impact on black applicants). 
 125.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k)(1)(A)–(C). 
 126.   Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 127.   Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. at 546. 
 128.   Id. at 541. 
 129.   Id. at 541–42 (“Entrepreneurs must be given latitude to consider market factors.  Zoning 
officials, moreover, must often make decisions based on a mix of factors, both objective (such as cost 
and traffic patterns) and, at least to some extent, subjective (such as preserving historic architecture).  
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The Court, however, found that this difference was not salient enough to 
prevent the Title VII analysis from applying to this aspect of the FHA.130 
At times, the courts’ reliance on Title VII precedent has been more 
complicated, particularly when there are relevant differences between the 
housing and employment contexts.  One example of this is in the area of 
sexual harassment.  Courts first developed the law of sexual harassment in 
the employment context.  Thus, when housing harassment cases started 
making their way through the court system roughly a decade later, all 
courts had to rely on was Title VII precedent.131  As commentators noted: 
Indeed, the law of sexual harassment in housing developed well after and 
in virtual lock-step with the law of sexual harassment in employment.  
Thus, courts have simply interpreted the Fair Housing Act (FHA) to 
prohibit sexual harassment to the same degree—and only to the same 
degree—as it is prohibited in employment by Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.132 
On one hand, this was helpful for advocates.  The existence of a 
framework for analysis of sexual harassment claims under Title VII made 
it much easier for housing plaintiffs to assert those claims under the FHA.  
To that extent, the courts’ use of Title VII precedent was beneficial and 
appropriate.  On the other hand, there were problems with applying the 
framework.  When federal courts developed the case law of hostile work 
environment sexual harassment for Title VII cases, they created a 
threshold standard for actionable claims.133  Thus, a plaintiff alleging 
hostile work environment sexual harassment could only prevail if she 
could show that the harassment she experienced was “severe or 
pervasive,” so as to “alter the terms or conditions of the victim’s 
employment.”134  The application of this rather imprecise standard became 
the key issue in many Title VII sexual harassment cases, with courts 
having to decide whether specific acts or statements in the workplace 
 
These factors contribute to a community’s quality of life and are legitimate concerns for housing 
authorities.  The FHA does not decree a particular vision of urban development; and it does not put 
housing authorities and private developers in a double bind of liability, subject to suit whether they 
choose to rejuvenate a city core or to promote new low-income housing in suburban communities.”). 
 130.   Id. at 541 (“To be sure, the Title VII framework may not transfer exactly to the fair-housing 
context, but the comparison suffices for present purposes.”). 
 131.   The first court to hear a case of sexual harassment in housing relied exclusively on Title VII 
precedent.  See Shellhammer v. Lewallen, No. C 82-689 ¶ 15,472 (W.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1983), aff’d, 
770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985).  Later cases followed suit.  See DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1005 
(7th Cir. 1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (10th Cir. 1993); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. 
Supp. 1393, 1394–97 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 132.   Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the Fair 
Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of § 3604(c), 2002 WIS. L. REV. 771, 773 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 133.   Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986). 
 134.   Id. (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).  
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cleared this threshold. 
Courts hearing housing harassment cases looked to employment cases 
involving similar conduct, even though the workplace and the home are 
very different contexts.  For example, “conduct that may appear harmless 
or less offensive in the workplace can become much more threatening 
when committed inside a woman’s home by someone who literally holds 
the keys.”135  Unfortunately, because courts were using employment 
precedent to inform their decisions in housing cases, they were reaching 
decisions that “many in the legal and academic world view[ed] as 
incorrect.”136  Other commenters noted: 
[R]eliance on Title VII is inappropriate in FHA cases because the 
housing context makes sexual harassment there worse than in the 
workplace.  The gist of this argument is that one’s home should be a 
special place of privacy and sanctuary and should be more protected 
from an outsider’s unwelcome intrusions than less sacrosanct locales 
such as the workplace.  In addition, a harassing landlord is seen as more 
threatening than a job supervisor, both because a landlord has virtually 
unlimited access to his potential victims at any time and because the 
unequal power relationship that is inherent in harassment cases is 
generally more pronounced in a landlord-tenant situation than in an 
employment setting.  This latter consideration is underscored by the fact 
that most reported cases of sexual harassment in housing have involved 
low-income women whose need for the housing controlled by their 
harasser is even more desperate than their counterparts’ need for a job in 
most workplace harassment cases.137 
Thus, even though the language prohibiting discrimination “based on 
sex” in Title VII and the FHA is identical, and the same “severe or 
pervasive” standard applies to hostile environment sexual harassment 
under both statutes, the differences in context between the workplace and 
the home justify applying the “severe or pervasive” standard differently.  
In other words, there are relevant factual differences between the two 
contexts which make Title VII precedent less helpful in certain sexual 
 
 135.   Rigel C. Oliveri, Sexual Harassment of Low-Income Women in Housing: Pilot Study 
Results, 83 MO. L. REV. 597, 605 (2018) (footnote omitted); see also, Nicole A. Forkenbrock 
Lindemyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit Application of Title VII Employment 
Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAW & INEQ. 351, 352–53 (2000); Michelle Adams, 
Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 17, 21 (1998) 
(“[S]exual harassment at home differs in context; a context that is reflected in the richness and 
complexity of our notions of home and women’s roles within that home.”); Deborah Zalesne, The 
Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title 
VIII: Who Is the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 885 (1997) (“Because of some 
fundamental differences . . . serious problems can arise if courts too closely equate the effects of 
workplace sexual harassment with the effects of rental housing sexual harassment.”). 
 136.   Oliveri, supra note 135, at 606 (footnote omitted). 
 137.   Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 132, at 786–87 (footnotes omitted). 
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harassment cases (even though courts were correct to base sexual 
harassment in housing claims on Title VII precedent, generally). 
It also would be inappropriate for a court to rely wholesale on Title 
VII to interpret a FHA case when there are relevant differences in 
underlying legal doctrines between the two statutes. For example, in 
Wetzel v. Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC138 the Seventh Circuit 
was asked to apply a Title VII standard to an FHA case and instead took a 
more cautious approach.  The case was brought by a woman who alleged 
that she was severely harassed by fellow residents of a senior living 
community because she was a lesbian.139  The Seventh Circuit reversed 
the lower court’s dismissal and recognized that well-established Title VII 
and FHA precedents allowed the plaintiff to bring such a claim.140  The 
more difficult question was how to define the standard of landlord liability 
for tenant-on-tenant harassment.  The plaintiff asked the court to apply the 
Title VII standard of employer liability for employee-on-employee 
harassment, but the court declined: 
We recognize, however, that there are some potentially important 
differences between the relationship that exists between an employer and 
an employee, in which one is the agent of the other, and that between a 
landlord and a tenant, in which the tenant is largely independent of the 
landlord.  We thus refrain from reflexively adopting the Title VII 
standard and continue our search for comparable situations.141 
In the Wetzel case, differences in context actually created different 
legal obligations.  Thus, a wholesale reliance on Title VII was 
inappropriate, even as the court used Title VII to support the basic 
framework analysis for the claim. 
In contrast, there is no reason why Bostock’s interpretation of 
“because of sex” in Title VII to include claims of discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity should not apply equally to the 
FHA.142  There is no relevant contextual difference to support a distinction, 
 
 138.   901 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2018).   
 139.   Id. at 859. 
 140.   Id. at 859–62. 
 141.   Id. at 863. 
 142.   Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to take this view in Walsh v. 
Friendship Village.  Plaintiffs appealed the District Court judgment against them 
in 2019.  The Eighth Circuit placed the plaintiffs’ appeal on hold pending the outcome  
of Bostock.  See Docket Entry, at https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/ 
I7F2B5E2A3B0E11E99D59C04243316042/View/FullText.html?listSource=RelatedInfo&list=Filin
gs&rank=7&originationContext=filings&transitionType=FilingsItem&contextData=%28sc.Keycite
%29 (entry on 5/29/2019: “Clerk Order: This appeal was held in abeyance pending the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, No. 17-1618.”).  After 
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either as a factual or a legal matter, nor is there any policy justification or 
historical reason to do so.  The similarities in the language, structure, and 
purpose of Title VII and the FHA support the application of Bostock’s 
reasoning to the housing context. 
As Justice Gorsuch argued in Bostock: 
Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in employment is a major 
piece of federal civil rights legislation.  It is written in starkly broad 
terms.  It has repeatedly produced unexpected applications, at least in the 
view of those on the receiving end of them.  Congress’s key drafting 
choices—to focus on discrimination against individuals and not merely 
between groups and to hold employers liable whenever sex is a but-for 
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries—virtually guaranteed that unexpected 
applications would emerge over time.143 
All of these observations about Title VII are equally true about the 
FHA.  Courts repeatedly invoke the FHA’s stated purpose, “to 
provide . . . . for fair housing throughout the United States”144 to justify a 
generous interpretation and broad application of the statute.145  This 
includes allowing novel theories of discrimination and protections for 
people who Congress might not have originally intended to be 
beneficiaries of the statute. 
The clearest example of this is the Supreme Court’s first fair housing 
case, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., in which a white 
tenant in a housing complex sought to challenge his landlord’s racially 
exclusionary practices.146  The plaintiff claimed he was deprived of the 
benefits of living in a racially-integrated environment and had suffered 
embarrassment from being “stigmatized” as a resident of a “white 
 
Bostock was decided, the Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the 
case for further proceedings in light of the opinion.  Walsh v. Friendship Village of South County, No. 
19-1395, 2020 WL 5361010, at *1 (8th Cir. July 2, 2020).  In December 2020, the case was settled for 
an undisclosed sum.  See Shahla Farzan, Same-Sex Couple Settle Housing Discrimination Lawsuit 
Against St. Louis Retirement Community, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Dec. 9, 2020), 
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/government-politics-issues/2020-12-09/same-sex-couple-settle-housi 
ng-discrimination-lawsuit-against-st-louis-retirement-community [https://perma.cc/FJ3C-VYJQ].  
 143.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020). 
 144.   42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
 145.   Cases citing this provision in support of broadly construing the Fair Housing Act include: 
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995); Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. 
Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 104–05 (3d Cir. 2017); Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th 
Cir. 2016); Connecticut Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Corelogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362, 
370 (D. Conn. 2019); S & R Dev. Ests., LLC v. Town of Greenburgh, 336 F. Supp. 3d 300, 310–11 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Guider v. Bauer, 865 F. Supp. 492, 495 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 
F. Supp. 208, 210–11 (N.D. Ill. 1985); United States v. Hughes Mem’l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 548 
(W.D. Va. 1975); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff’d, 547 F.2d 1168 
(6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Real Est. Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Miss. 1972). 
 146.   409 U.S. 205, 206–07 (1972). 
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ghetto.”147  The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds 
that the plaintiff was not in the class of people entitled to sue under the 
FHA.148  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.149  A unanimous 
Supreme Court reversed.150  It observed that “[t]he language of the Act is 
broad and inclusive,” that the Act carries out a “policy that Congress 
considered to be of the highest priority,” and that vitality can be given to 
this policy “only by a generous construction of the statute.”151 
Thus, even though Congress likely was not thinking of plaintiffs or 
injuries of this type when it passed the FHA, the letter and the spirit of the 
statute still reached this claim.  This is precisely the same reasoning the 
Bostock court relied on in interpreting Title VII. 
In addition, it might be more important for sexual orientation to be 
considered a sex-based protected characteristic under the FHA.  The 
housing context makes it more likely that a prospective landlord will be 
aware of a tenant’s sexual orientation than would be the case for an 
employee in the workplace.  This is because residential leases require the 
names of every person who will reside in a unit, and many require a 
statement of their relationship.  Thus, a landlord will know if two people 
of the same sex are living together.  If they are sharing a one-bedroom 
apartment, or have the same last name—or are married—they are 
effectively “outed.”  This is true regardless of whether they display other 
gender nonconforming behavior (thus making a bootstrapped Price 
Waterhouse theory of discrimination unavailable).  Moreover, housing 
discrimination against couples based on their relationship to one another 
harms both of them, as well as everyone else in their household.  Indeed, 
the FHA has long been used to address discrimination against people based 
on their romantic associations with one other.  This has been most notably 
the case with interracial couples.  Courts have frequently used the Loving 
theory of association (cited in Hively) to hold that housing discrimination 
against interracial couples constitutes discrimination based on race.152 
 
 147.   Id. at 208. 
 148.   Id. 
 149.   Id. 
 150.   Id. 
 151.   Id. at 209–12 (internal citations omitted).  The Supreme Court again referred to “the broad 
remedial intent of Congress embodied in the [Fair Housing] Act” in another unanimous Fair Housing 
Act opinion.  See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982).  See also City of 
Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (reaffirming Trafficante’s recognition of 
the Fair Housing Act’s “broad and inclusive compass” and therefore its entitlement to a “generous 
construction”). 
 152.   Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 288 (2003); United States v. Big D Enters., 184 F.3d 924, 
928 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hylton, 944 F. Supp. 2d 176, 187–88 (D. Conn. 2013); Oliver v. 
Shelly, 538 F. Supp. 600, 601–02 (S.D. Tex. 1982).  
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IV. MIXED MOTIVE ANALYSIS 
There is, however, one issue that might complicate the analysis and, 
as in the cases described in the previous Section, give housing courts pause 
before they adopt Bostock’s reasoning.  The identical “because of . . . sex” 
language in both Title VII and the FHA operates as a causation 
requirement.153  Courts struggle with the contours of this requirement, 
recognizing that both statutes are intended to eradicate discrimination 
based on protected characteristics, while also preserving a landlord or 
employer’s ability to take legitimate factors into consideration.  This leads 
to the so-called “mixed motives” problem: what happens when there is 
evidence that a defendant was motivated by both permissible and 
impermissible factors when it took action against a plaintiff?  At what 
point can the court determine that discrimination constitutes 
discrimination “because of” a protected characteristic, even when there are 
other possible causes?  The two statutes differ in their treatment of this 
issue.  This Section discusses these differences, and whether they impede 
applying Bostock’s analysis to the FHA. 
A. Mixed Motives Analysis Under Title VII and the FHA 
Courts have struggled with the mixed motives issue in the Title VII 
context.  The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress did 
not mean to require proof that impermissible discrimination was the 
defendant’s sole motivation.154  Nor, however, did Congress originally 
mean to create liability when discriminatory intent played a negligible role 
in a defendant’s decision making.155  Thus, something other than 
traditional “but-for” liability was warranted, but the courts were left 
without guidance on what the standard of causation should be. 
In Price Waterhouse the Court heard evidence that the defendant was 
motivated by a combination of permissible reasons and impermissible 
gender stereotyping when it failed to promote Ann Hopkins to partner.156  
The Court failed to reach a majority opinion about the causation issue.  
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, held that once an employee 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that sex motivated an 
 
 153.   Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, with 42 U.S.C. § 3604.  
 154.   An amendment which would have added the word “solely” to the bill, modifying “sex,” was 
defeated on the floor in the House of Representatives.  See Bonnie H. Schwartz, Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 57 U.S.L.W. 4469 (U.S. May 1, 1989) (No. 87-1167): Causation and Burdens of Proof in 
Title VII Mixed Motive Cases, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 501, 511 n.67 (1990) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 13,837–
38 (daily ed. June 1964) (statement of Sen. McClellan)).  
 155.   Id. at 511–13.  
 156.   Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233–35 (1989) (plurality opinion).  
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employment decision in any way, the burden then shifts to the employer.157  
The employer may avoid a finding of liability only if it proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision 
absent its unlawful consideration of sex.158  Justice O’Connor wrote 
separately to argue that the plaintiff must prove that unlawful 
discrimination was a “substantial factor” in the defendant’s decision 
making, a conclusion that Justice White agreed with.159  Justice Kennedy, 
dissenting, pointed out that even though the plurality repudiated a 
construction of the “words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-
for causation,’”160 its approach essentially created just that, only with 
burden-shifting at the back end.161 
In 1991 Congress codified this standard when it amended Title VII.  
The Civil Rights Amendments Act established that “an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”162  The statute also included the “same-
decision” defense, but made it only a partial defense.163  Thus, a defendant 
who successfully argues this defense can escape liability for compensatory 
and punitive damages, but can still be liable for injunctive relief and 
attorney’s fees.164 
The Fair Housing Act has not been amended in this way.  Prior to the 
1991 Act, courts hearing fair housing cases relied on Price Waterhouse.  
Courts continued to do so after the 1991 Act, arguing that the Court’s 
 
 157.   Id. at 250 (“In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we 
mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we 
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a 
woman.”). 
 158.   Id. at 252. 
 159.   Id. at 262–69 (O’Connor, J. concurring).  The various factions of the court also disagreed 
with how the plaintiff makes this showing (e.g., whether direct or circumstantial evidence would 
suffice) and the standard of proof each side must bear (preponderance of the evidence or clear and 
convincing evidence).  Id. at 249–55 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); 
Id. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 287–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
 160.   Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 161.   Id. at 283 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may 
sow confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to but-for causation, yet it adopts a but-
for standard once it has placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the employer.  This approach 
conflates the question whether causation must be shown with the question of how it is to be shown.”). 
 162.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  Thus, the history of the mixed motive issue is similar to that of 
disparate impact theory, discussed in the previous Section.  Both concepts were originally introduced 
to Title VII jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, and both were later incorporated into the statute by 
congressional amendment.  See supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.  The Fair Housing Act 
has not been amended to include these theories. 
 163.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 164.   Id. 
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original interpretation of the “because of” language was still sound.165  
Given the identical statutory language and long history of FHA cases 
relying on Title VII precedent, most advocates assume this is the proper 
approach, though the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue.166 
Another case dealing with a different employment discrimination 
statute casts doubt on whether the Price Waterhouse mixed motive 
standard should govern housing discrimination cases.  In 2009 the Court 
decided Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,167 which dealt with mixed 
motive cases under the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).  Like the FHA, the ADEA has identical “because of” language 
and has not been amended to include a mixed motives theory.168  In Gross, 
the Court determined that the Price Waterhouse standard did not apply in 
ADEA mixed motive cases because Congress did not amend the ADEA 
when it amended Title VII, even though it contemporaneously amended 
the ADEA in several other ways.169  Free to examine the issue as one of 
first impression, a bare majority of the Court refused to endorse the mixed 
motive theory, arguing that Price Waterhouse was difficult to apply and 
created confusion for lower courts.170  The 5–4 decision held that the 
proper standard should be “but-for” causation and that the plaintiff should 
retain the burden of persuasion throughout such a case “to establish that 
age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.”171 
Thus, if Price Waterhouse does apply to housing cases with mixed 
motives, the plaintiff need only show that impermissible discrimination 
played some role in the challenged housing decision.  The burden then 
shifts to the defendant, who will be liable unless it can prove by a 
 
 165.   E.g., United States v. Big D Enters., 184 F.3d 924, 931–32 (8th Cir. 1999); Cato v. Jilek, 
779 F. Supp. 937, 943–44 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 166.   Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation, § 10:3 (1990). 
 167.   557 U.S. 167, 169–70 (2009). 
 168.   29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
 169.   The Court noted that “[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it 
is presumed to have acted intentionally, and “negative implications raised by disparate provisions are 
strongest” where the provisions were “considered simultaneously when the language raising the 
implication was inserted.”  Gross, 557 U.S. at 174–75 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244, 256 (1991)).  In contrast, Congress did not simultaneously amend the FHA when it amended 
Title VII, so this argument should carry little weight in a fair housing case. 
 170.   Id. at 179. 
 171.   Id. at 175–78.  Another case from the October 2020 term, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020), provides another example of the current Court’s 
reluctance to deviate from the but-for causation standard.  In this case, the Court was asked whether a 
plaintiff bringing a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was required to plead (and prove) that racial animus 
was the “but-for” cause of the defendant’s actions, or whether a more lenient pleading standard might 
apply.  Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013–14.  The Court held there was no reason to deviate from 
the “but-for” causation standard.  Id. at 1019.  This has little bearing on the present matter, however, 
because the Court grounded its analysis in the text, structure, and history of § 1981, which differs in 
significant and material ways from both Title VII and the FHA. 
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preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action in 
the absence of the illegal consideration.  If the defendant satisfies this 
burden, it will not be liable under the FHA.  If Price Waterhouse does not 
apply to housing cases with mixed motives, the plaintiff will not succeed 
unless she can demonstrate that impermissible discrimination was a “but-
for” cause of the negative action. 
B. Bostock, Mixed Motives, and the FHA 
The question, then, is what do these different approaches to mixed 
motive theory mean for housing cases after Bostock?  The Bostock 
majority opinion spends a significant amount of time dissecting what the 
phrase “because of . . . sex” means from the standpoint of causation.  
Indeed, the “tried and true” comparative method articulated in Hively and 
adopted in Bostock is essentially a causation test.  It requires holding all 
factors constant except for the tested variable (in this case, the sex of the 
plaintiff), in order to determine the causative effect of the variable.  As 
Justice Gorsuch explained: 
An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual 
employee based in part on sex.  It doesn’t matter if other factors besides 
the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision. . . . If the employer 
intentionally relies in part on an individual employee’s sex when 
deciding to discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the 
employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer—
a statutory violation has occurred.172 
The Court started from the premise that “homosexuality and 
transgender status are distinct concepts from sex,”173 and attempted to 
tease out the role that “sex” plays in sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination: 
Often, events have multiple but-for causes.  So, for example, if a car 
accident occurred both because the defendant ran a red light and because 
the plaintiff failed to signal his turn at the intersection, we might call 
each a but-for cause of the collision.  When it comes to Title VII, the 
adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant 
cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to 
its challenged employment decision.  So long as the plaintiff’s sex was 
one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.174 
Passages like this appear to invoke the mixed motives theory, which 
 
 172.   Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). 
 173.   Id. at 1746–47.  
 174.   Id. at 1739 (internal citations omitted). 
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involves judicial interpretation (and later statutory clarification) of the 
“because of sex” language.  Put another way, at first blush it appears the 
Court is examining two factors—one arguably permissible (discrimination 
based on sexual orientation/gender identity) and one prohibited 
(discrimination based on sex)—and trying to figure out the causative role 
that each plays in a decision.  If this is the case, then applying the Court’s 
analysis to the FHA might be difficult, as the particular type of mixed 
motives analysis differs from the Title VII context.  Recall that under Title 
VII, a defendant is liable when impermissible discrimination plays any 
role in its decision.  The defendant carries the burden of proving a same-
decision defense, but even if successful this will only be a partial 
defense—a shield for damages.  Under the FHA (at least to the extent that 
it follows Price Waterhouse), a mixed motives theory is also available, but 
the same-decision defense will serve as a complete defense to liability.  If 
Price Waterhouse does not apply, then a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
impermissible discrimination was the “but-for” cause of the negative 
action. 
Does this mean that a sexual orientation/gender identity claim is 
harder for a FHA plaintiff than a Title VII plaintiff?  Will it be possible 
for an FHA defendant to argue that it would have made the same decision 
to discriminate based on the “permissible” factors of sexual 
orientation/gender identity regardless of the fact that an impermissible 
factor (sex) played a role?  Would an FHA plaintiff have to demonstrate 
that discrimination based on the protected characteristic was the primary 
or motivating factor?  Do these differences in interpreting “because of sex” 
with respect to mixed motive cases mean that Bostock’s “because of sex” 
analysis should not even apply to FHA cases? 
The simple answer is no.  While it might have superficially seemed 
like Bostock was engaged in mixed motives analysis when it used the 
comparative method, in fact, it was not.  There were not two possible 
motives at play, one permissible and one prohibited.  Instead, the Court 
recognized that, while the characteristic of sex is not the same as sexual 
orientation and gender identity, it cannot be disaggregated from them 
either.175  Sex is inextricably bound up in both of these concepts.  As the 
Bostock Court acknowledged, “discrimination based on homosexuality or 
transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first 
cannot happen without the second.”176  The Court went on to clarify: 
[H]omosexuality and transgender status are inextricably bound up with 
 
 175.   Id. at 1741–47. 
 176.   Id. at 1747. 
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sex.  Not because homosexuality or transgender status are related to sex 
in some vague sense or because discrimination on these bases has some 
disparate impact on one sex or another, but because to discriminate on 
these grounds requires an employer to intentionally treat individual 
employees differently because of their sex.177 
If, as the Court concluded, “it is impossible to discriminate against a 
person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating 
against that individual based on sex,” then there are no mixed motives 
here—if anything, the motives are interlocking.178  Thus, there should be 
no problem with applying Bostock’s analysis that the term “because of 
sex” in Title VII includes sexual orientation and gender identity to the 
FHA because the FHA contains identical language.  The two statutes may 
differ when it comes to mixed motives analysis, but this issue does not 
actually implicate mixed motives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There should be little doubt that the Court’s reasoning in Bostock—
that the prohibition on discrimination “because of sex” in Title VII 
encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity—should apply with equal force to identical language in the Fair 
Housing Act.  The two statutes have a similar language, structure, and 
purpose.  As a result, courts have long used Title VII analysis to guide 
their interpretation of the FHA.  There are no relevant differences between 
the housing and employment contexts when it comes to this issue that 
might give courts pause.  The slight differences between the two statutes 
with respect to the mixed motives theory should not create an impediment, 
because the issue of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination 
does not, in fact, implicate mixed motives at all. 
On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order 
addressing Bostock and directing federal agencies to enforce the law in a 
manner consistent with that opinion.179  As this Article was being prepared 
for publication, HUD became the first agency to do so.  HUD’s Office of 
Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) issued a memorandum 
stating that, in light of the Executive Order and Bostock, it would begin 
enforcing the FHA to combat discrimination on the basis of sexual 
 
 177.   Id. at 1742. 
 178.   Id. at 1741.  To put the final point on this, the Court emphasized that “nothing in our analysis 
depends on the motivating factor [but-for cause] test.”  Id. at 1740. 
    179.     Exec. Order No. 13988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021).  
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orientation and gender identity.180  The memo states: 
 
Effective immediately, FHEO shall accept for filing and 
investigate all complaints of sex discrimination, including 
discrimination because of gender identity or sexual orientation, 
that meet other jurisdictional requirements. . . . .  Similarly, FHEO 
shall conduct all other activities involving the application, 
interpretation, and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act’s 
prohibition on sex discrimination to include discrimination 
because of sexual orientation and gender identity.181 
 
While this memo only applies to HUD, and does not technically bind 
courts in private lawsuits, it is still significant for a number of reasons.  
First, HUD’s FHEO itself processes a significant minority of 
administrative housing discrimination complaints.  Second, as an agency 
charged with enforcement of the FHA, HUD’s interpretation of the statute 
is entitled to some deference by courts.  Finally, the memo affects state 
and local agencies that enter into agreements with HUD under its Fair 
Housing Assistance Program (FHAP).  Such agencies process the majority 
(approximately 80%) of administrative housing discrimination complaints 
filed in the U.S.  They can receive funding and technical support for 
processing state housing discrimination claims, so long as the law of their 
state is certified as “substantially equivalent” to the federal FHA.  As the 
memo makes clear: 
 
In order for FHAP agencies’ laws to remain substantially equivalent, 
they must be administered consistent with Bostock.  To be consistent with 
Bostock, the state or local law either must explicitly prohibit 
discrimination because of gender identity and sexual orientation or must 
include prohibitions on sex discrimination that are interpreted and applied 
to include discrimination because of gender identity and sexual 
orientation.182 
 
Agencies in thirty-seven states currently participate in the FHAP 
 
 180.   Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. on Implementation of Executive 
Order 13988 on the Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act (Feb. 11, 2021), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/HUD_Memo_EO13988.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP 
5N-3S3A]. 
 181.   Id. at 2. 
 182.   Id. 
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program,183 receiving a total of roughly twenty-four million dollars.184  
Currently, eleven of these states neither explicitly prohibit discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, nor interpret their existing 
prohibitions to cover these characteristics.185  Thus, these states risk losing 
significant federal assistance in enforcing their fair housing laws.  The risk 
of losing these funds might provide an incentive for these states to amend 
their laws to reflect President Biden’s Executive Order. 
 
Bostock was a significant win for the LGBTQ community, and it will 
undoubtedly have ramifications for other remedial civil rights laws.  In the 
absence of Congressional action to protect LGBTQ individuals from 
discrimination, the Supreme Court has stepped in to read these protections 
back into the law.  While some may question the propriety of this practice 
from a separation of powers perspective, the Court has clearly staked out 
a position on this issue.  In the coming litigation that will inevitably ensue 
under other statutes, there is no reason to think that the Court’s reasoning 
should be limited to the employment context.  This is especially true for 
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